By
Ola Olateju
As Nigeria’s political terrain heats up ahead of 2027, the All Progressives Congress (APC) increasingly resembles less a disciplined ruling party and more a sprawling refuge camp for embattled politicians. From Nyesom Wike to the G5 defectors and beyond, the APC has welcomed a flood of political migrants seeking sanctuary from prosecution, party sanctions, or political oblivion. But beneath the surface lies a dangerous gamble: can a party survive let alone govern effectively when loyalty is bought, ideology is blurred, and survival is the only creed? This analysis unpacks the hidden risks behind APC’s open-door politics.
In contemporary Nigerian politics, party loyalty is often transactional rather than ideological, reflecting deeper issues within the country’s political culture. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC), which has morphed into what can be best described as a veritable refugee camp for embattled politicianssuch as those seeking escape from the hammer of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) or from internal disciplinary actions within their original parties. This development reflects a broader pattern of “political instrumentalism” (Joseph, 1991), where party affiliation becomes less about ideology and more about securing personal immunity and political survival.The examples are telling. Former Rivers State Governor Nyesom Wike and his G5 associates—Samuel Ortom, Okezie Ikpeazu, Ifeanyi Ugwuanyi, and Seyi Makinde—openly revolted against the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) during the 2023 elections. Although Wike now serves as a minister in the APC-led government, he remains nominally PDP, highlighting the transactional nature of his alignment which is emblematic of the refuge strategy that portraysloyalty as rented but not bought.
In a bid to swell its ranks, the APC has pursued a quantity-over-quality strategy, admitting virtually anyone willing to cross over, regardless of their ethical baggage or past misdeeds. However, this influx, while offering a temporary boost in numbers, may create profound contradictions that could threaten the party’s cohesion and long-term viability.Rather than consolidating its internal strength or ideologically redefining its platform for national development, the APC seems to have embraced expansion at any cost, prioritizing quantity over quality in membership. This phenomenon fits into what Richard Joseph (1991) described as “prebendal politics,” where public institutions are captured and distributed among elites purely for personal advantage rather than public service.
In political terms, a refugee camp is a metaphor for a space of temporary asylum, not one of permanent belonging or ideological commitment. Many of those who defect to the APC do so not because they share the party’s supposed ideology, but because they seek safety from legal prosecution or political irrelevance.
The APC’s open-door policy has inadvertently sown the seeds of what Huntington (1968) famously described as “political decay”—where institutional adaptability is outpaced by social and political demands. Founding members who painstakingly built the party now find themselves competing for relevance and control against new entrants who, after securing their refuge, seek to assert influence over party structures. This creates a dual-class party system. The original loyalists versus the opportunistic defectors.
As North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009) argued in Violence and Social Orders, when elite bargains become unstable, factions emerge, and political organizations risk fragmentation. The APC’s current trajectory fits this pattern. The internal contradictions between foundational visionaries and refuge seekers could implode the party from within, especially as competition for 2027 presidential tickets intensifies.
The APC’s founding coalition, an alliance between northern political heavyweights, southwestern progressives, and fragments of former PDP elites was always fragile. Now, with the addition of defectors driven by survivalist instincts, the party faces an inevitable struggle for control.
The original members, having invested years into building the party’s structures, are unlikely to cede influence easily. Meanwhile, the new entrants, armed with federal appointments and new access to resources, will push for relevance and leadership positions. This intra-party competition risks degenerating into open factional warfare, as suggested by Samuel Huntington (1968), who warned that “political organizations that expand too rapidly without institutional depth often collapse under the weight of their contradictions.”Already, tensions are rising within the APC, with competing power blocs jostling for dominance ahead of the 2027 elections. Presidential ambition, state-level succession battles, and resource allocation struggleswill only sharpen these divisions.
Defections and the Illusion of Electoral Strength
Contrary to the ruling party’s hopes, the influx of defectors does not guarantee electoral success. Defections offer short-term headlines but rarely guarantee long-term gains. As Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) noted, in modern political systems, voter loyalty is increasingly tied to perceived authenticity rather than party labels. When voters view defectors as opportunists rather than as committed leaders, the supposed electoral value of these defectors often evaporates. This shows that political capital is not always transferable because voters often view such moves with suspicion, perceiving defectors as self-serving rather than as genuine leaders. Thus, the APC may find that many of its high-profile recruits have defected without their full electoral value.
The 2023 elections illustrated this vividly. Despite welcoming many influential figures, the APC suffered notable setbacks in several states where defectors had promised political magic. As Dalton and Wattenberg (2000) note, in periods of political realignment, “partisan dealignment” often occurs where voters decouple from political elites entirely, preferring authenticity over opportunistic maneuvers.
Despite defecting to the APC, former Cross River State Governor Ben Ayade and former Zamfara State Governor Bello Matawalle failed to deliver their states during the elections, undermining the myth that defections guarantee electoral strength. The transfer of party does not automatically mean transfer of electoral value because those defectors who lost their states during the 2023 elections highlighted the illusion of political invincibility that often accompanies defections.As Bratton and van de Walle (1997) observed in Democratic Experiments in Africa, loyalty within African political parties often hinges on access to material benefits rather than shared political ideals, a dynamic fully at play within today’s APC.Moreover, the political context matters. Nigeria’s increasingly sophisticated electorate is no longer as beholden to “big men” as it once was. Thus, a defector’s personal ambition may not necessarily translate into electoral mobilization.
The Risk of Internal Sabotage
There is also a dangerous irony. Many of the defectors are political survivalists, not ideological converts. Some of these so-called “refugees” may eventually work against the APC from within. If they perceive that the APC has served its purpose in shielding them from immediate threats, they might actively undermine the party’s cohesion. Some could even return to their original bases, especially if political tides shift or if the EFCC’s focus wanes. As Geddes (1999) noted, parties built primarily on personalistic coalitions rather than ideological affinity tend to be unstable and prone to internal betrayal. Indeed, as Bratton and van de Walle (1997) observed, patron-client systems like Nigeria’s often collapse when elite bargains falter. When survival, not ideology, defines political behavior, betrayal becomes inevitable.
APC’s Dangerous Gamble with A Pyrrhic Expansion
The APC’s strategy of offering political asylum to embattled politicians represents a dangerous gamble. In seeking to expand its numbers without regard for loyalty, ideology, or integrity, the party risks becoming a victim of its own success. Refugees who joined for survival, not conviction, may well be the ones who ignite the implosion from within.
Ultimately, the APC’s refugee camp strategy may amount to a pyrrhic expansion—a short-term gain setting up long-term disaster. By prioritizing opportunistic expansion over disciplined consolidation, the party is laying the groundwork for internal disintegration. It risks becoming a confederation of self-interested factions rather than a coherent political force.
As the 2027 elections loom larger, the APC must grapple with an uncomfortable truth: a house built on shifting sands cannot withstand the coming storms. Political survival in Nigeria today demands not just numbers, but cohesion, credibility, a clear moral compass, loyalty, ideological clarity, and credible leadership, qualities that cannot be manufactured by simply collecting defectors fleeing from the consequences of their political actions. In the final analysis, political survival cannot be permanently secured by opportunistic alliances. It demands institutional integrity and strategic foresight. Without these, the APC risks being remembered not as a formidable ruling party, but as a transient refugee camp in the annals of Nigerian political history. If the APC fails to recognize this truth, it may soon find that the very people it welcomed as “refugees” are the ones who will pull down its tent from within.
OLA OLATEJU WRITES FROM ACHIEVERS UNIVERSITY, OWO. ONDO STATE
