By
Nze David N. Ugwu
The Geopolitics of Insecurity, Elections, and America’s New “Country of Particular Concern” Tag on Nigeria
Introduction: When Two Presidents’ Agendas Cross
In geopolitics, coincidences are rare. What looks like coincidence is often convergence — where the ambitions of different actors intersect in unexpected ways. The recent decision by U.S. President Donald Trump to designate Nigeria a Country of Particular Concern (CPC) has jolted Nigeria’s political class, alarmed security watchers, and injected a new variable into an already volatile national security equation.
But beneath the diplomatic noise lies a more provocative question: Has Donald Trump unintentionally played into the hands of President Bola Ahmed Tinubu?
Tinubu, who has struggled to contain insecurity — from banditry to jihadist insurgency to rural terrorism — faces a 2027 political horizon that heavily shapes his security calculations. Trump, on the other hand, is pursuing a muscular foreign policy playbook that relishes force projection, confrontation with Islamist militancy, and geopolitical dominance in the Sahel.
The intersection of these two agendas may produce outcomes neither side openly admits, yet both may quietly welcome.
Nigeria’s Dual Doctrines: Confront or Negotiate?
Tinubu inherited a fractured security doctrine, split by two contradictory schools of thought:
- The Hard Doctrine (“Destroy the Terrorists”)
Backed by the now-removed Chief of Army Staff, Lt. Gen. Christopher Musa, this doctrine favors kinetic action — decimate insurgents, dismantle supply lines, take back ungoverned spaces, and reassert state authority through force.
- The Soft Doctrine (“Negotiate and Reintegrate”)
Championed by National Security Adviser Nuhu Ribadu, this approach seeks dialogue, amnesty, and reintegration. It mirrors the Yar’Adua-era strategy used for the Niger Delta militants, but applied to ideologically driven extremists such as Boko Haram factions, ISWAP cells, and rural bandits.
Tinubu has vacillated, not because one doctrine is inherently superior, but because politics — not strategy — has become the core compass of national security under his administration.
The removal of Gen. Musa — a Middle Belt Christian who symbolized the hardline approach — signaled not just a shift in doctrine, but a victory for Ribadu’s camp. It also exposed the ethnic, religious, and electoral calculations shaping decisions that ought to be purely strategic.
Why Politics Now Shapes Security: The 2027 Factor
Tinubu’s overarching priority is not defeating insurgency — it is winning re-election in 2027. That reality shapes everything.
Why the North Matters
Tinubu’s 2023 victory rested heavily on votes from the Muslim North. Any aggressive kinetic campaign in the North West or North East risks alienating the same bloc. Many rural northern communities — caught between state forces and extremists — often interpret large-scale military operations as an assault on their region rather than liberation.
This is the political minefield Tinubu is trying to avoid.
Why Amnesty Appeals to Tinubu
Amnesty programs project empathy, signal inclusion, and avoid mass displacement — all politically useful. More importantly, they avoid the optics of a Southern President “waging war” on the North.
Thus Tinubu prefers amnesty — not necessarily because it is effective, but because it offends fewer key constituencies.
Ribadu’s 2031 Ambition
Ribadu is playing a longer game. A loyal lieutenant today could become a viable presidential contender tomorrow. By helping Tinubu retain northern support, Ribadu is quietly investing in his own 2031 prospects. Strengthening northern approval for the administration simultaneously boosts his future base.
Together, Tinubu and Ribadu have crafted an informal political pact: prioritize electoral calculus over military logic.
Enter Donald Trump: America’s New Posture
Then comes Donald Trump. His decision to categorize Nigeria as a Country of Particular Concern stems officially from religious freedom concerns. But seasoned analysts know it is also grounded in:
- The resurgence of jihadist movements in the Sahel
- Weak regional counterterror coordination
- America’s desire to reassert influence after Russian and Chinese inroads
- Trump’s personal preference for blunt, muscular foreign policy
Trump has also repeatedly emphasized destroying terrorist networks in the Sahel — including ISWAP, Boko Haram remnants, and affiliates across Niger, Chad, and northern Nigeria.
If Trump acts on his threats — including “destroying terrorists in Niger through whatever means necessary” — the implications for Nigeria are profound.
And ironically, those implications may help Tinubu.
How Trump’s Policy Could Advance Tinubu’s Political Interests
- Outsourcing the “Dirty Work”
By allowing America to strike terror networks in the Sahel, Tinubu avoids the political fallout of launching such operations himself. He can maintain public posture as a peace-seeking leader while external forces degrade insurgent capacity.
- Blaming External Actors
If Northern communities protest U.S. military activity, Tinubu can distance himself, claiming it is Trump’s unilateral decision. This gives him the perfect shield: security improves, but political backlash targets Washington, not Abuja.
- Maintaining Northern Support, Keeping Southern Approval
Southerners want decisive action against terrorists. Northerners want minimal civilian casualties.
Letting America bear the brunt allows Tinubu to claim neutrality while enjoying the benefits of both outcomes.
- Weakening Terror Networks Without Bearing Responsibility
If foreign strikes significantly weaken ISWAP, Ansaru, Boko Haram splinters, and bandit kingpins, Tinubu enters the 2027 campaign as the President under whom insecurity finally turned. He won’t need to justify negotiations, failed amnesty, or underperformance — the metrics will appear improved on their own.
This is realpolitik, not morality.
But What Does Ribadu Gain?
Ribadu benefits in three ways:
- A Strengthened Narrative of “National Stabilizer”
Even if he personally prefers amnesty, he can spin future security gains as evidence of his strategic competence.
- Northern Approval
By ensuring Tinubu does not directly antagonize northern sentiments, he avoids alienating the base he will need in 2031.
- A Rebranded Record
Ribadu’s earlier failures to fully contain insurgency will be overshadowed by apparent progress during his tenure — even if driven externally.
Thus, Trump’s policy may inadvertently boost not just Tinubu’s 2027 chances, but Ribadu’s long-term ambitions.
The Risks: What Tinubu Should Fear
- Loss of Sovereignty Narrative
Opponents may accuse Tinubu of “outsourcing Nigeria’s security to Washington.”
This could be politically damaging if mishandled.
- Civilian Casualties
U.S. strikes — especially drone operations — risk collateral damage. Tinubu may face domestic outrage if Nigerians die in foreign-led operations.
- Radicalization Surge
Foreign intervention sometimes triggers new recruitment waves for extremist groups.
- Pushback from Northern Elders and Clerics
Many northern leaders resent Western military involvement. Tinubu must be cautious not to appear complicit.
Despite these risks, Tinubu’s calculation may still be that the political benefits outweigh the costs — especially since he can blame Trump for any negative fallout.
Conclusion: A Dangerous Symbiosis
So has Donald Trump played into the hands of Bola Tinubu?
Yes — perhaps more than Washington realizes.
Tinubu wants electoral victory more than strategic victory. Ribadu wants political viability more than doctrinal clarity. Trump wants geopolitical dominance more than African diplomacy.
In this triangular convergence, Nigeria’s insecurity becomes a chessboard on which each of these players advances his own agenda.
But here is the brutal truth:
Nigeria’s security problem cannot be sustainably outsourced, politicized, or subsidized by foreign strikes.
If Nigeria’s leaders continue to prioritize elections over strategy, ambition over coherence, and optics over outcomes, then even if terrorists are weakened today, the underlying architecture of insecurity will remain untouched.
Trump may help Tinubu win 2027. He may inadvertently help Ribadu prepare for 2031.
But he cannot build the Nigeria that Nigerians deserve.
That responsibility still lies squarely in Abuja — and it cannot be outsourced.
