Dangerous Path To Power

By

Nze David N. Ugwu

Introduction

Power is among the most potent of human drives. It is the capacity to make others act according to one’s will, to shape society’s structures, to allocate resources, to command obedience—formal or informal. In modern history, there have been countless individuals who have sought not merely to govern, but to dominate, to re-order society, to bend entire nations to their desires. Their path is often dangerous: the acquisition of power, its consolidation, and its ultimate exercise lead to oppression, mass violence, institutional breakdown, and sometimes to the unraveling of nations.

This essay explores the anatomy of power: how it is acquired (through manipulation, coercion, ideological mobilization, alliances), how it is consolidated (via elimination of rivals, control of institutions, propaganda), and how it is used (often brutally) by some of the world’s most dangerous dictators — Adolf Hitler, Benito Mussolini, Joseph Stalin, Pol Pot, Idi Amin, and Sani Abacha. We then zero in on Nigeria and how President Tinubu is allegedly exploiting fault-lines in the country’s history to engineer power acquisition; how the country appears increasingly divided into North and South; how southern governors have decamped to the ruling party; and how the 2027 presidential election may morph into a North-South contest — raising the danger of national splintering.

By drawing lessons from the past, and applying them to the present Nigerian context, the essay aims to show that power is not merely a matter of formal elections or constitutional process: it is also about manipulation, narrative control, institutional capture, and the creation of existential fault-lines. The “dangerous path” lies precisely in how these combine, often invisibly, until the nation reaches a critical rupture.

The Acquisition of Power

To acquire power, leaders often employ a mix of manipulation, rhetoric, alliance-building, fear, and opportunism. Let us unpack some recurring mechanisms:

 Ideological appeal + populist promise

Many aspiring dictators seize on crisis: economic breakdown, social fragmentation, fear of external or internal enemies. They present themselves as saviours, promising renewal, national greatness, or return to past glory. For example, Hitler promised Germany restoration after the humiliation of Versailles; Mussolini promised “Roman greatness”; Pol Pot promised radical social purging; Amin promised renewal of Uganda; Abacha presented himself as restorer of stability.

 Manipulation of elites + alliances

Acquiring power is rarely solitary. One must co-opt elites: military, bureaucracy, party apparatus, business interests. In many cases opportunistic alliances are formed and then discarded once power is secured. The aspiring ruler may engage in horse-trading, patronage networks, and the creation of clientelism.

Exploitation of institutional weaknesses

Power-seekers exploit weak rules, constitutional loopholes, economic crisis, fractured oppositions. They may harness violence or threat of violence to undermine opponents, create fear, and coerce compliance. They may also use populism to undermine independent institutions: courts, press, electoral bodies.

Subversion of legitimacy

Once the groundwork is laid, power‐seekers often present themselves as the only credible alternative. They frame opposition as traitors, internal enemies, or agents of foreign powers. They delegitimise dissent. They may even use elections (or façade elections) to claim legitimacy while undermining the substantive constraints on power.

Thus, acquisition of power rarely happens simply by a peaceful election and smooth handover; it involves manipulation of institutions and people, creation of alliances, exploitation of crisis and fear, all with the aim of establishing dominance.

The Consolidation of Power

Having acquired a foothold, the next phase is consolidation: making power sticky, making it difficult for opponents to remove you, controlling institutions, shaping the narrative, and eliminating independent centres of power.

 Purges, elimination of rivals

Many dictators engage in purges of internal opponents: party members, military officers, bureaucrats. Stalin’s purges in the 1930s are a canonical example. Eliminating rivals ensures no internal competition.

 Control of security apparatus

A robust security and enforcement apparatus is key: police, secret police, military intelligence, surveillance, often brutal. That enables repression of opposition, intimidation of civil society, suppression of dissent. The domination of the Security and   in Nigeria by one ethnic group is a clear sign of the dangers ahead.  When one ethnic group controls the coercive instrument of power and the President happens to come from that same ethnic group, it is indicative of a sinister power grab in the making.

Propaganda and control of information

Manipulation of media, creation of cults of personality, rewriting the past, controlling what people know. Mussolini, Hitler, Stalin all created massive propaganda machines. Pol Pot’s regime sought to eliminate schools and history; Abacha controlled media in Nigeria. Tinubu’s propaganda machinery – funding of some strategically placed personalities to propagate disinformation and misinformation about government achievements (which reflects only on paper and not on the streets), domination of the social media space, infiltration of student union leadership, neutralizing of the trade unions, all these are pointers of things to come.

Institutional capture

Turning nominally independent institutions – courts, parliament, electoral bodies, state enterprises – into instruments of power. Laws may be changed, constitutions amended, rules suspended. The result: the façade of constitutionalism hides a de facto authoritarian regime. Since the emergence of Tinubu as the President in 2023, the Legislature, the Courts, and INEC have been turned into departments in the Presidency.  The Senate and the House of Representatives have become rubber stamp legislatures.  The Courts fair no better as witnessed during the emergency rule in Rivers State.

 Patronage and clientelism

Providing rewards to those loyal, sanctioning those who oppose. This builds a network of dependence: officials, elites, businesspeople tied to regime for privileges. Over time, the state becomes a machine for distribution of patronage rather than for public service.

Once these mechanisms are in place, the regime becomes resilient: opposition is weakened, the economy is channelized to maintain elite support, surveillance and coercion keep the masses in check. The leader moves from being a hopeful aspirant to the de facto master of the polity.

The Use (and Abuse) of Power

Once consolidated, power is used not primarily for the public good but for the regime’s survival, amplification of the leader’s will, and often for ideological or personal agendas. The abuse of power takes many forms:

 Mass violence, repression, terror

Dictators often use terror to keep populations compliant. Stalin’s Gulag, Hitler’s SS, Pol Pot’s killing fields, Abacha’s Nigeria. The victimization of groups (ethnic, religious, political) is common.

 Economic looting and extraction

The regime becomes a vehicle for personal enrichment. State resources diverted to the elite or leader’s circle; corruption becomes systemic. The public economy often suffers. The Coastal Road project that did not follow the competitive bidding procedure, the massive corruption in the public sector space and the high octane impunity displayed by most of the people in government, all highlight the looting of public funds for personal political gains.

 Social engineering and ideological campaigns

Leaders may attempt radical transformations: class war, ethnic cleansing, cleansing of “enemies”, re-education. Pol Pot’s Cambodia is an extreme case; Stalin’s collectivisation is another.

 Suppression of civil society and pluralism

Independent media shut down, opposition parties banned or neutered, dissent criminalised. The society becomes atomised, fear permeates.

International adventurism or isolation

Some regimes use external wars to rally domestic support, distract from internal failures, or export their ideology. Hitler, Mussolini, Amin (to a degree) pursued external adventurism. Others withdraw and isolate.

The use of power is rarely benevolent when it follows this path: power becomes self-perpetuating; its logic is survival, not service. The “dangerous path” emerges when power no longer seeks legitimacy through service but through domination, fear, and extraction.

 Case Studies: Dangerous Dictators

Adolf Hitler (Germany)

Hitler leveraged the post-WWI crisis, mass unemployment, national humiliation, and the fear of communism to rise. Once in power, he quickly eliminated rivals (the Night of the Long Knives, 1934), controlled the media via the Reich Ministry of Propaganda, created the Gestapo to suppress dissent. He co-opted the army, the Nazi Party became the dominant institution. His use of power resulted in genocidal policies (the Holocaust), war, totalitarian control, and the destruction of Germany and much of Europe.

 Benito Mussolini (Italy)

Mussolini came to power promising order and national glory in the aftermath of WWI. He built the Fascist Party, marched on Rome (1922), and gradually eroded institutions by passing laws that made the Fascists the only legal party. He controlled the media, suppressed unions, used the OVRA secret police. His regime glorified the state and the leader; in the end, Italy was drawn into disastrous war and the regime collapsed.

 Joseph Stalin (Soviet Union)

Stalin consolidated power by out-maneuvering rivals (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev), instituting purges, gulag labour camps, and mass terror (the Great Purge, 1936-38). He collectivised agriculture, causing millions of deaths (the Holodomor in Ukraine). He turned the Communist Party, the state, and the security apparatus into instruments of his personal will. The use of power was ideological and ruthless.

 Pol Pot (Cambodia)

Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge seized Phnom Penh in 1975, shut down the economy, evacuated cities, and attempted to create a peasant utopia. The regime killed up to a quarter of the population through forced labour, executions, starvation, disease. This is perhaps one of the most extreme abuses of power: total domination, ideological purification, utilising terror to engineer society from scratch.

 Idi Amin (Uganda)

Idi Amin came to power via military coup (1971). He quickly suspended the constitution, suppressed opposition, purged perceived rivals, created a cult of personality, and embarked on erratic domestic and foreign policies. His rule was characterised by brutality, economic mismanagement, human rights abuses, expulsion of Asians from Uganda, and widespread corruption.

Sani Abacha (Nigeria)

Sani Abacha (1993-1998) is a key Nigerian case. He seized power via military takeover, suppressed dissent, imposed decrees to shut down media and political activity, looted state resources (estimates of tens of billions of US dollars of stolen state funds), executed opponents (e.g., Ken Saro-Wiwa), and maintained power through patronage and military repression. Abacha’s rule serves as a vivid illustration of how power can be consolidated and used for personal and regime survival rather than national development.

Common Threads and Lessons

When we extract from these historical cases, we see recurring patterns:

• Crisis + uncertainty: economic decline, war, social fragmentation provide the opening for power-grabbers.
• Manipulation and myth-making: leaders present themselves as saviours, exploit fear, scapegoat enemies (real or imagined).
• Capture of institutions: turning courts, media, security forces into instruments of power.
• Elimination or neutralisation of opposition: political, military, civil society.
• Patronage networks and corruption: using the state to reward loyalty and punish dissent.
• Division and polarisation: playing on identity (ethnic, religious, regional) to fragment society or rally support.
• Centralisation of power: concentration in the leader’s hands, weakening decentralised or democratic checks.

These dynamics make power dangerous: once in motion, they rarely reverse without painful ruptures. Democracies turn into dictatorships; nations fragment; human rights collapse; state legitimacy erodes.

Nigeria: Historical Fault-Lines

To understand how the dangerous path to power could be playing out in Nigeria, we must first recognise the country’s historical fault-lines.

• Ethno-regional division: Nigeria is a federation of many ethnic groups, but historically three major regions (North, West, East) shaped the politics of independence and post-independence. The question of “who rules whom” has always had an ethno-regional dimension.
• Military rule and patronage: Between the 1960s and 1999, Nigeria went through several military coups and dictatorships that institutionalised a model of power-capture, patronage, and extraction (e.g., Gowon, Obasanjo – as military head, Buhari – as military head). The legacy of state capture is strong.
• Resource (oil) dependency and rent-seeking: The discovery of oil in the Niger Delta created both wealth and conflict. Control over oil revenues, pipelines, states, has been a source of power and division.
• Civil war and unresolved grievances: The Nigerian civil war (1967–70) left deep scars, especially among the Igbo (southeast region) and in discourse around “one Nigeria”. Post-war narratives of marginalisation continue to affect national cohesion.
• Regional imbalances and corruption: Some regions have felt more favoured than others; corruption and clientelism remain endemic; democratic institutions have often been weak.

These fault-lines give fertile ground for power-seekers: divisions can be exploited; identities can be mobilised; elites can be co-opted; institutions weak enough to be captured.

 Tinubu and the Engineering of Power Acquisition

Now we turn to President Bola Tinubu. While it is not appropriate to label him (in this analytic essay) definitively as a dictator, it is pertinent to analyse how his rise and current tactics bear resemblance to the manipulative acquisition of power seen in the dictators’ cases — albeit in a democratic façade.

 Political background and network-building

According to Al Jazeera, Tinubu has long built a network of contacts from Lagos transport unions and market cooperatives, transforming his Lagos base into a national power machine.  He has been popularly described as a “king-maker” in Nigerian politics. Through that network, he orchestrated the formation of the ruling party and positioned himself for the presidency.

 Manipulation, defections and party engineering

One notable feature is the wave of opposition defections to the ruling party All Progressives Congress (APC). As Deutsche Welle pointed out, Tinubu has convinced several opposition politicians to join the APC, weakening the opposition ahead of the 2027 election. Deutsche Welle Papers also show that in the South-South region, once dominated by the rival People’s Democratic Party (PDP), governors and political actors have decamped to the APC.

These defections are manipulative: they signal to elites that loyalty to Tinubu and the APC is rewarded, while opposition is risky. They also weaken the capacity of institutionalised opposition to hold power-seekers in check.

The same defection fever has infected both the South-East and the South-South. In the South-South region, all the six states that make up the region (previously dominated by the PDP have now all defected to the APC. The South-East region is following the same trajectory with only Abia and Anambra still remaining in the opposition.

The danger in this arrangement is that all the Southern States in the country now belong to the APC.  Will this be perceived as a gang up to remain in power or to continue dominating the North? How will the North respond if they read the same meaning into this development? What if, just what if the 2027 election turns out to be between the North and the South?

 Control of institutions and fault-line exploitation

Tinubu’s administration has taken steps that raise concern about institutional autonomy. For example, in March 2025 he declared a state of emergency in Rivers State (an oil-rich, opposition-held state), suspended the governor, deputy governor, and state lawmakers, and replaced them with a federal caretaker. This action is regarded by critics as an example of central government overreach and institutional capture.

Moreover, Tinubu has publicly emphasised his alliances with the legislature: “Having Senate President Akpabio … and the Speaker … on my side is enough for me to succeed,” he stated.  This suggests an intertwining of legislative and executive power in the service of regime stability, rather than independent check-and-balance.

 North-South dynamics and fault-line exploitation

There is evidence that Tinubu is receiving strong backing from the North, and that his support-building is regionally skewed. A report from The Guardian notes that northern figures praised Tinubu’s contributions and mobilised support for him from the North ahead of 2027.

At the same time southern governors (traditionally more aligned with the PDP) have been decamping to the APC. This shift diminishes the political autonomy of the South and may produce an alignment of the South behind the federal ruling party — reducing the South’s capacity to act as a distinct power centre.

This scenario suggests a deliberate strategy of consolidating power across regions by neutralising autonomous opposition bases and aligning elites through defections, alliances and incentives. In effect, the “power acquisition” phase is being engineered through networks, defections, institutional manipulation, and regional alignment.

Division of the Country: North vs South, Elite Alignments

One of the most troubling features of the current Nigerian dynamic is the apparent bifurcation of the country into North and South in political alignment, which — if allowed to harden — may become the substrate for national fragmentation.

Governors and elite defections

As cited, many southern governors have decamped to the APC, offering the federal ruling party a near-monopoly of elite alignment across both North and South. The South-South region’s defection is specifically documented: “2027: How PDP governors surrendered South-South to Tinubu.”  The convergence of southern elites into the APC reduces political pluralism and regional resistance.

 North’s backing of Tinubu

The North’s strong backing of Tinubu is also significant. It signals that Tinubu’s regime is reaching across regional divides, but also potentially aligning more strongly with northern interests. The Guardian reported on northern support for Tinubu’s agenda and project.

 Implications of division

When elites and governors across regions align with one ruling party while the opposition is neutered or fragmented, the sense of national balance may be disturbed. If political competition becomes regionally defined (North vs South) rather than cross-cutting, then the nation risks becoming divided into two blocs rather than a unified whole.

Moreover, if 2027 becomes framed (or perceived) as a contest between a northern candidate and a southern candidate (or vice-versa) rather than across ideology or policy, then regional identities may dominate. This risks turning a democratic tournament into a zero-sum ethno-regional fight, where the loser may feel alienated and excluded.

The 2027 Presidential Election and the Danger of Splintering

The upcoming 2027 presidential election in Nigeria is already being framed around power dynamics. According to Wikipedia, general elections will be held, and Tinubu has expressed intention to run for a second term under the APC.

 Scenarios of regional contest

• If the APC supports a northern candidate (or allows Tinubu to run) and the opposition rallies around a southern candidate (or vice versa), the election may crystallise into a North vs South contest.
• If the election outcome is seen not simply as a change of party but a change of regional dominance, then the stakes become existential for regions: losing means marginalisation or exclusion.
• The memory of the civil war (especially among the Igbo in the South-East) remains alive; the prospect of a “winner-take-all” contest on regional lines may resurrect fears of exclusion or secession.

 Risks of national fracturing

• Alienation of the “losing” region: If one region or group perceives itself as permanently excluded from power, political loyalty may erode, and demands for autonomy or secession may grow.
• Weakening of national institutions: If power is perceived as the preserve of one bloc, institutions lose legitimacy; elections may be seen as hollow; divisions deepen.
• Return to fault-line politics: If regional identity becomes the predominant mobilisation axis rather than ideology or policy, then national unity is weakened. The country risks becoming two blocs in competition rather than one federation in consensual rivalry.
• Potential for violence or disruption: If election outcomes are disputed, or if regions feel their fate is existentially tied to the result, then civil unrest, protests, or worse may follow.

 Specific to Tinubu’s context

Given Tinubu’s consolidation of elite support across South and North, and his alignment with powerful regional actors, the opposition may struggle to present a viable alternative. If the election becomes a referendum on Tinubu’s power project (rather than a policy contest), then the winner may assume not just office but dominance of the political system — intensifying fears of one-party capture.

The Danger of Power Paths Repeating History

What we see in Nigeria, in this analysis, is not necessarily a perfect replication of Hitler, Stalin or Pol Pot — but echoes of their power-acquisition strategies. The danger is that if these paths are unchallenged, the country may slide toward more authoritarian or divided outcomes.

Manipulation of elites and defections mirror the clientelism of past dictators.

• Control of institutions, as seen in the Rivers State emergency rule, provides precedent for centralising power.
• Division of regions and aligning of elites echo the “divide-and-rule” or identity-based mobilisation seen in many authoritarian regimes.
• Erosion of opposition and pluralism weakens the safeguards of democracy.

If Nigeria’s 2027 political architecture becomes an either/or between North and South, then the mechanisms of national splintering may be activated. Institutions may be sidelined, identity politics may predominate, and the political culture may shift from competitive democracy to hegemonic rule.

Possible Safeguards and What Must Be Resisted

Given the risks, what safeguards are essential to prevent the dangerous path to power from advancing further in Nigeria?

• Strengthening of independent institutions: Courts, electoral bodies, media, civil society must remain autonomous and robust to hold power to account.
• Promotion of inclusive national identity: Rather than regional exclusion, the political system must emphasise Nigeria’s unity, and power must be seen as legitimately shared across regions and identities.
• Clear rules for party competition: Political defections, dominance of one party, must be balanced by viable opposition and competitive politics.
• Transparent electoral process: The 2027 election should be free, fair, inclusive and perceived as legitimate; perceptions of rigging or exclusion may deepen divisions.
• Regional equity and decentralisation: Addressing historical grievances and ensuring resource sharing, regional empowerment, and fiscal autonomy can reduce the sense of exclusion.
• Civic education and national dialogue: The public must understand that elections are not merely about one region dominating another; dialogue across regions about common purpose is critical.

If these safeguards fail, the country may fall into a pattern of “winner-takes-all”, regionalpolarisation, and authoritarian entrenchment.

Conclusion

Power is not simply the prize of elections nor the holding of office—it is the capacity to shape society’s institutions, identity narratives, resource flows, and the levers of enforcement. The most dangerous path to power is one that begins with crisis and ends with domination: acquiring power through manipulation, consolidating it through institutional capture, and using it for survival rather than service.

History offers cruel lessons: Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Pol Pot, Amin, Abacha—all show how that path leads to devastation, division and destruction. Their tactics: mobilise fear, co-opt elites, destroy independent centres of power, divide societies along identity lines, and centralise decision-making.

In Nigeria, President Bola Tinubu’s rise and current manoeuvres reflect certain patterns of manipulation, elite-capture, institutional weakening and regional division. The collapse of southern elite autonomy (governors decamping to the ruling party), support from the North, emergency powers in states such as Rivers, and the looming 2027 election structured around regional contest raise serious red flags.

If the 2027 election becomes a North-versus-South battle, if power is perceived as the possession of one bloc, then the risk is not only of democratic erosion but of national splintering. The country could slide into a “two-bloc” system, where regional identity replaces national citizenship, and the losing side becomes alienated. That is the dangerous path.

To avoid it, Nigeria must revive the inclusive institutions, fairness, shared identity, transparent competition and decentralised governance. Power must be seen as a shared public resource, not the spoils of one regional coalition or revolving elite. Otherwise, the road to power may lead not to national renewal, but to national rupture.

Nze David N. Ugwu is the Managing Consultant of Knowledge Research Consult. He could be reached at [email protected] or +2348037269333.