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Did President Tinubu Actually Take A Bullet For Nigeria Or Throw Nigerians Under The Bus?

Did President Tinubu Actually Take A Bullet For Nigeria Or Throw Nigerians Under The Bus?

 By

Nze David N. Ugwu

 

There is a dangerous tendency in Nigerian politics to repackage policy failures as acts of courage, economic hardship as necessary sacrifice, and poor judgment as bold leadership. Once a government has made a controversial decision, its supporters often devote more energy to defending the decision than examining its consequences. This appears to be the emerging narrative surrounding President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s economic reforms.

One of the President’s advisers, Dele Alake, was recently reported to have claimed that Tinubu took a bullet for Nigeria. The argument appears to be that the removal of petroleum subsidy, the foreign exchange reforms and the devaluation of the naira were difficult but courageous decisions that previous administrations lacked the political will to implement.

But this raises a fundamental question: Did President Tinubu take a bullet for Nigeria, or did he throw Nigerians under the bus?

The distinction is important because courage and competence are not the same thing. A leader can be courageous and still make disastrous decisions. A leader can demonstrate political will and still lack the necessary understanding, preparation and strategic judgment required to manage the consequences of those decisions.

Leadership is not simply about the willingness to take difficult decisions. It is about the ability to make the right decisions, at the right time, in the right sequence, with adequate preparation and a clear understanding of their consequences.

Unfortunately, this is where the Tinubu administration’s economic reform programme deserves serious scrutiny.

The removal of petroleum subsidy on the very day President Tinubu was sworn into office on May 29, 2023, remains one of the most consequential economic decisions of his administration. The President announced that the subsidy was gone without first explaining the implementation framework, presenting a comprehensive mitigation plan or preparing Nigerians for the immediate consequences.

Was the announcement necessary? Perhaps. Was the timing and manner of implementation prudent? That is an entirely different question.

A responsible leader does not confuse speed with effectiveness. The fact that a problem has existed for decades does not mean that the solution must be implemented overnight, particularly when millions of citizens are directly exposed to its consequences.

Petroleum subsidy was an expensive and poorly managed policy. It created opportunities for corruption, smuggling, arbitrage and the diversion of public resources. Successive administrations struggled with its management, and there were legitimate arguments for reforming the system.

But removing a bad policy is not automatically an achievement. What matters is what replaces it, how the transition is managed and whether the people who bear the immediate costs are adequately protected.

The President could have announced a clear transition programme, allowed a reasonable period for public communication, established credible social protection mechanisms and put transportation interventions in place before implementing the policy. He could have undertaken extensive consultations with organised labour, employers, state governments, transport operators and other critical stakeholders.

Instead, Nigerians were confronted with a sudden increase in the cost of transportation, food, goods and essential services. The consequences spread through virtually every segment of the economy.

The question is not whether subsidy removal was desirable. The question is whether the government demonstrated sufficient preparation, foresight and sensitivity in implementing it.

Courage without preparation is not necessarily leadership. Sometimes, it is recklessness.

The foreign exchange reforms that followed raise similar questions.

Nigeria’s multiple exchange rate system was riddled with distortions, opportunities for rent-seeking and preferential access to foreign exchange. There was a compelling argument for reforming the system. However, unifying exchange rates without ensuring adequate foreign exchange liquidity, restoring investor confidence, strengthening domestic production and establishing effective monetary coordination created another set of problems.

The naira experienced significant depreciation. Businesses that depended on imported raw materials, machinery, equipment and intermediate goods struggled to survive. Manufacturers faced rising production costs. Importers passed increased costs to consumers. The prices of essential commodities escalated, while the purchasing power of ordinary Nigerians deteriorated.

It is important to distinguish between the decision to unify the exchange rate and the subsequent depreciation of the naira. They are related, but they are not identical. The former was a policy decision; the latter reflected, among other things, market conditions, supply constraints, confidence problems and the manner in which the new regime was managed.

The World Bank itself acknowledged the necessity of addressing Nigeria’s exchange rate distortions. However, it also stressed the importance of complementary monetary and fiscal policies, clear communication and social protection. In other words, the reforms required more than announcements. They required careful coordination and execution.

This is where the Tinubu administration’s approach deserves criticism. The President appeared more concerned with announcing the reforms than demonstrating that the institutions responsible for implementing them were adequately prepared to manage their consequences.

A reform programme is not a press statement. It is a process involving planning, sequencing, institutional capacity, stakeholder engagement, risk assessment and continuous evaluation.

The government cannot simply announce that an economic distortion has been removed and expect the economy to adjust without significant intervention.

There is also the question of sequencing. Why should a government remove petroleum subsidy, liberalise the foreign exchange market and embark on other major economic adjustments almost simultaneously without first establishing strong mechanisms to cushion the resulting shocks?

Economic reforms are not isolated events. They interact with one another. A sudden increase in petrol prices affects transportation costs. Transportation costs affect food prices. Currency depreciation increases the cost of imported inputs. Higher production costs affect employment, household incomes and business survival.

When these pressures occur simultaneously, their cumulative impact can be devastating, particularly in an economy where millions of citizens already struggle to meet basic needs.

The President and his advisers should have understood this relationship before embarking on the reforms.

The International Monetary Fund’s own assessment of Nigeria’s reform programme acknowledged the difficult circumstances, rising inflation, persistent pressure on the naira, widespread poverty and increasing food insecurity. It also emphasised that the successful implementation of the reforms required well-designed social safety nets.

This raises another important issue: the government’s responsibility to protect citizens during economic transitions.

It is not enough to tell Nigerians that they must endure hardship today because tomorrow will be better. Governments have a responsibility to make the transition bearable, especially for vulnerable citizens who have little or no capacity to absorb economic shocks.

Where were the comprehensive transportation alternatives before subsidy removal? Where were the adequately funded and verifiable social intervention programmes? Where was the credible mechanism for ensuring that the savings from subsidy removal translated into measurable improvements in public services, infrastructure, healthcare, education and social protection?

The World Bank warned from the outset that subsidy removal needed to be accompanied by compensatory measures to protect poor and vulnerable households. It specifically identified large-scale cash transfers as an important intervention.

These were not obscure economic considerations that the government could not have anticipated. They were foreseeable consequences of the decisions being taken.

A government that understands the human consequences of its policies must prepare for them before implementation, not after citizens have begun to suffer.

There is a fundamental difference between asking citizens to make sacrifices for national development and imposing sacrifices on them without adequate preparation or protection.

The former is responsible leadership. The latter is an abdication of responsibility.

Another disturbing dimension of this debate is the tendency of government officials to measure the success of economic reforms by the amount of political courage required to announce them rather than by their actual impact on the lives of citizens.

Since when did the willingness to take difficult decisions become sufficient evidence of good governance?

A decision is not good simply because it is unpopular. Neither is a policy necessarily wrong because it causes temporary discomfort. The proper test is whether the policy is well-designed, appropriately sequenced, competently implemented and capable of delivering benefits that justify its costs.

If a surgeon announces that he has the courage to perform a difficult operation but fails to conduct the necessary tests, prepare the patient or arrange the appropriate aftercare, would we celebrate his courage if the patient suffers complications?

Why should economic management be treated differently?

A country is not a laboratory where leaders can experiment with the lives of millions of people and subsequently explain away the consequences as unavoidable sacrifices.

Presidential leadership requires more than boldness. It requires intellectual discipline, sound judgment, empathy, strategic foresight and the capacity to anticipate the consequences of policy choices.

A President must be willing to listen to opposing views, examine alternative options, test assumptions and subject major decisions to rigorous scrutiny before implementation.

This is particularly important in Nigeria, where the economy is highly vulnerable, public institutions are weak, infrastructure is inadequate and millions of households have limited financial resilience.

Tinubu inherited a troubled economy. There is no serious argument about that. The previous administration left behind significant fiscal, monetary and structural problems. The multiple exchange rate system, subsidy arrangements, mounting public debt, declining purchasing power and weak productive capacity were not created overnight.

However, inheriting a difficult situation does not absolve a new administration of responsibility for its own decisions.

The responsibility of a new President is to understand the nature of the problems, examine the available options, establish priorities and develop a credible implementation strategy.

It is perfectly legitimate to argue that some of the reforms were necessary. It is equally legitimate to question the manner in which they were introduced and managed.

 

Indeed, even the World Bank, while welcoming the reforms, emphasised the need for complementary measures, effective implementation and protection for vulnerable households. Its position was never that announcing the reforms alone would guarantee economic recovery.

That is the distinction President Tinubu’s defenders appear unwilling to acknowledge.

Taking a bullet means accepting personal risk or making a sacrifice for the protection and benefit of others. But who exactly benefited from the manner in which these reforms were implemented? And who absorbed the greatest pain?

Millions of Nigerians saw their savings lose purchasing power, their transport expenses multiply, their food budgets become inadequate and their businesses struggle under escalating operating costs.

Workers whose salaries remained largely unchanged were expected to adjust to a dramatically more expensive economy. Pensioners, low-income earners and informal-sector workers were particularly exposed.

For many families, the issue was no longer economic theory or macroeconomic stabilisation. It was survival.

It is therefore difficult to understand how a government can describe the experience of millions of its citizens as the President taking a bullet for them without first demonstrating that it did everything reasonably possible to prevent unnecessary suffering.

There is also a political danger in this kind of narrative. When advisers surround a President with applause instead of honest assessments, they create an environment in which mistakes become difficult to acknowledge and policy failures become difficult to correct.

The President needs advisers who will tell him when his policies are failing, not publicists who will manufacture heroic descriptions of every controversial decision.

A good adviser must have the courage to disagree with the President. Loyalty should not mean intellectual submission. Indeed, the greater the consequences of a presidential decision, the greater the obligation of advisers to challenge assumptions, identify risks and present alternative options.

If everybody in the room agrees with the President, somebody is probably not doing his job.

 

The recent defence by Dele Alake illustrates this problem. Rather than simply celebrating the President’s supposed courage, his advisers should be explaining the measurable benefits of the reforms, acknowledging their shortcomings and presenting credible evidence that the sacrifices demanded of Nigerians are producing meaningful results. Alake’s reported remarks were made in defence of the administration’s economic record, but political defence should not replace objective evaluation.

 

There is nothing wrong with taking difficult decisions. There is everything wrong with making major decisions without adequate preparation and then expecting citizens to applaud the consequences.

President Tinubu had an opportunity to demonstrate a different kind of leadership: one that combines courage with competence, ambition with preparation, and reform with compassion. He could have taken Nigerians into confidence, explained the options, prepared the institutions, introduced protective measures and implemented the reforms in a carefully managed sequence.

That would have been courage backed by competence.

Ultimately, history will not judge President Tinubu by the number of difficult announcements he made, the political risks he took or the applause of his advisers. It will judge him by the quality of his decisions, the effectiveness of their implementation and the measurable improvement in the living conditions of Nigerians.

A President does not take a bullet for his country merely by introducing unpopular economic policies. He takes a bullet when he is prepared to bear the political consequences of doing what is right while protecting the people he has sworn to serve.

And when the people, rather than the political leadership, bear the overwhelming consequences of poorly managed decisions, it becomes difficult to describe the experience as presidential sacrifice.

Perhaps the more appropriate question is not whether Tinubu took a bullet for Nigeria.

Did he take the bullet, or did he pull the trigger and leave Nigerians to absorb the impact?

That is a question his advisers cannot answer with political slogans. Only the evidence of better governance, economic recovery and improved living conditions can provide a convincing answer.

NZE DAVID N. UGWU IS THE MANAGING CONSULTANT OF KNOWLEDGE RESEARCH CONSULT. HE COULD BE REACHED AT [email protected] OR +2348037269333

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